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Fetishism: A Double Denial
Masakazu TANAKA
“The fi rst step is to take fetishism seriously; not as a threat but as a promise.” [McCallum 
1999: xi]
1. Why fetishism now?
We live among objects of  all kinds. Indeed, surrounding materiality and our material cor-
poreality are two self-evident bases of  our lives. Even so, among the myriad studies of  mate-
rial culture and plethora of  discussion about the body, few thinkers have studied both with 
a unifying purview. This article discusses the signifi cance of  notions of  fetish and fetishism 
as part of  a comprehensive framework for understanding our relationships both with mate-
rial objects and the body. Concepts of  fetishism have been mainly deployed in three ways: 
religious, economic, and psychoanalytic. So the fi rst task is to re-examine these three kinds of  
fetishism, and present an alternative interpretation of  fetishism. Here, I also emphasize how 
useful fetishism is as a tool (methodological fetishism) for criticizing modernist discourses.1
2. Critique of “instrumentalism”
During the last two centuries, the features of  the modern nation-state, based on democra-
cy, secularization and separation of  powers, and the market economy were formed in different 
ways in various parts of  the world. Public debate in the most economically successful trading 
and manufacturing nation-states is informed by principles that can be traced back to the En-
lightenment, and political and social life is now characterized by inherited, taken-for-granted 
social formations, practices, and ideologies that initially grew out of  critical thought.
In their institutional organizations, modern states operate with an essentially European 
concept of  personhood, centred on the ideal of  an autonomous and rational individual (usu-




ally an adult white European male). Such a model has required the ‘other’, judged by compari-
son, to be inferior. This kind of  ideology is sustained by, and spawns, dichotomies such as 
reason and emotion, rationality and irrationality, consciousness and unconsciousness, spirit 
and body, individual and society, human versus non-human entities including plants, ani-
mals, and material objects, fully human and less human, such as white and non-white, male 
and female, adult and minor, and West and East. This mode of  locating the self  and other had 
implications beyond the cognitive realm. Unable to see beyond the prejudices of  Orientalism, 
especially in the 19th century, European males assumed the “white man’s burden” and set out 
to “civilize” through colonization.
One of  the crucial differences between persons and material objects is the capacity for 
action. It is natural to assume that persons are active subjects, and that things around them 
are passive objects. After all, people manipulate objects. This kind of  one-sided relationship 
is generally considered normal and natural.
When people control objects, they are involved in an ‘instrumental relationship’ that 
involves utilization of  material things. As ‘rational’ or ‘superior’ beings, persons reserve 
the right to utilize other organisms and inanimate objects. Despite criticism, most famously 
stated in Kant’s Second Maxim, this kind of  instrumental attitude has been, and continues to 
be, also applied to relations within human relations. Asymmetrical dichotomies––including 
male and female, the West (its people) and the East, adult and child, capital and labour––have 
supported ideologies that make it easier to exploit people in the kind of  instrumental rela-
tionships that persons have with objects. The asymmetry of  these dichotomies justifi es the 
relationships in which the superior controls and utilizes, as a tool or resource, the inferior. 
Thus, the instrumentalization or subjectifi cation of  objects and other organisms in nature is 
extended to other human beings as well. And it goes even further. Our own bodies, the nature 
within ourselves, is also often considered in an instrumental way.2
Two issues haunt the instrumental outlook. One is the way it grasps persons, material 
objects, and the natural world (henceforth referred to as others, objects and nature) surround-
ing the individual as a single, overarching category. The imperative to accomplish tasks, or 
to meet targets, requires that everything be treated as a means to an end and, as such, things 
(now viewed as resources) are valued according how effi ciently they help to achieve stipulat-
ed goals. Likewise, the relationship between the self  and others/objects/nature is determined 
by notions of  effi ciency. This concern with effi ciency simplifi es what would otherwise be 
diverse and complex relationships and reduces them to a single dimension. People become 
bound by or obsessed with numbers: elapsed time, production quotas, numerical targets, and 
other quantifi able values.
2 To simplify the argument, the discussion here mainly concerns the relationship between persons 
and objects, but the same can be said for the relationship between persons and their bodies.
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Secondly, the subject-object relationship is always one-sided. Others/objects/nature is 
a class of  matter for manipulation and use by the self. In this way of  thinking, the self  is 
never utilized by anything, except situationally or structurally by other people. This way of  
thinking, however, does not very well match reality, in which the relationship with others/ob-
jects/nature is multiplex and characterized by reciprocal interaction. Persons are not involved 
in a one-way relationship with the world. We can easily conceive of  reciprocal interactions 
between one person and another person or between persons and nature. But what about 
relationships between persons and objects? How do objects, such as a pebble on the side of  
the road or a pencil on a desk, interact with us? It is here that the concept of  fetish proves its 
worth.
Objects are not perceived solely as tools or as resources: they also serve as symbols. An 
object may be endowed with meaning, in which case it functions as a sign or more generally 
as a text to be read. However ambiguous the meaning embodied by the object as text may 
be, the process of  deciphering is always a one-sided subject-object relationship. A person 
deciphers an object’s meaning, not vice versa. Even though we can read multiplex meanings 
from an object, the one-sided orientation remains the same as when objects are treated as 
instruments or resources.
Concentrating on the things needed to fulfi l the basic needs of  human life––food, cloth-
ing and housing––material culture has long been a subject of  cultural anthropology. The 
conventional approaches of  this specialized empirical fi eld of  study, however, do not shed 
further light on reality. When diffusionism was in vogue, by focussing on the physical dif-
ferences between spatially distributed objects, it was possible to disregard the people who 
made the objects and the societies comprising relationships between people, in which they 
were formed. When analyzed as symbols, before long, even the objects themselves came to be 
of  little interest to anthropologists.
At this juncture, the concept of  fetishism may be able to take us beyond an impasse 
in understanding, allowing us to open up what appear to be unilateral and asymmetrical 
relationships between people and objects.3 In other words, the fetish concept undermines the 
assumption of  dichotomous relations between living things and inanimate objects. Employed 
in this way, the fetish may have the power to rework our view of  the unilateral subject-object 
relationship, one in which people have the upper hand. At the same time, the concept of  
fetishism encourages a mode of  thought that does not stray from objects. Fetishism does not 
allow objects to be abstractly regarded merely as texts. It seems to me that the diverse and 
mutually interactive relationship between people and objects can be readily traced using the 
concept of  fetishism.
3 See McCallum [1999: xi–xii].
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3. What is fetishism?
As I mentioned earlier, the term fetishism has primarily been used in three fi elds4 in
religious analysis (de Brosses); in economics (Marx); and in sexuality studies(Freud). As will 
be discussed below furter, fetishism as a concept had its origins in a religious discourse about 
objects that were considered to have special power. Originally applied to “any of  the objects 
used by the natives of  the Guinea coast and the neighbouring regions as amulets or means 
of  enchantment, or regarded by them with superstitious dread” (Oxford English Dictionary), 
what became the term fetish was often translated as “object with supernatural power” or 
“object of  worship”.5 The concept of  commodity fetishism was proposed by Marx in Das Ka-
pital to criticize the reversed valuation of  commodities and labour that held sway in capitalist 
societies. Referring to desire aroused by certain objects, such as lingerie or particular parts 
of  the body, sexual fetishism was introduced to the literature by Binet (Du fétichisme dans 
l’amour [Fetishism in Love], 1887), and elaborated by Krafft-Ebing (Psychopathia Sexualis, 
4th Ed., 1889) and Freud (Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie, 1905).
Common to all three types of  fetishism is a displacement of  fundamental values such 
as god, human labour, sexuality. They are rejected or concealed, and then seen as inhering 
in a completely different source, usually a specifi c object. In short, fetishism has been used 
to refer to a kind of  misconception which involves a fetish as a surrogate. Religiously, a 
block of  wood is worshipped instead of  a god. In political economy, capitalists in pursuit of  
commodities and currency negate human labour, regard persons as means rather than ends, 
and thereby alienate people from their products. In sexuality, stimulation is excited by, for 
example, lingerie or the feet, which are misconceived as acceptable objects of  desire.
One of  the keys to understanding fetishism is this displacement. While naïve observ-
ers might be able to point out that the Emperor has no clothes, only outsiders with critical 
faculties can account for such misconceptions. Up to now, research into fetishism has been 
largely devoted to exposing the logic of  displacement in fetishism from a critical, enlightened 
perspective. This article, however, concentrates on using the critical power of  the concepts 
arising from fetishism, hitherto regarded as a phenomenon to be criticized. Here, we aim to 
criticize familiar modernist thought through fetishism.
To do this we need to examine the concepts of  fetishism and fetish more closely. Pietz, 
the leading expert in fetishism research today, was chiefl y responsible for rekindling interest 
in fetishism as a critical concept. According to him, the term “fetishism” arose during the 
late 15th century in the interaction between Portuguese merchants and people living in West 
Africa [Pietz 1985, 1987, 1988; Pietz & Apter (eds.) 1993]. The merchants referred to certain 
4 See Gamman & Makinen [1994] for details.
5 See Ellen [1988] and Pool [1990] for the religious or ethnographic use of  fetishism.
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objects venerated by the local people as ‘fetiço’, a word meaning ‘sorcery’, the root of  which 
is also present in the word ‘artifi ce.’
Christian theologians, however, distinguished between idols and fetishes: whereas idols 
were objects with a malevolent spiritual being, fetishes were simply objects and nothing 
more.6 Fetish had the connotation of  object being mixed up with spirituality, two elements 
that should be kept distinct from each other. Some observers referred to fetishes as “nonsensi-
cal” (and therefore ineffective) objects of  worship. Pietz describes the situation as follows:
The fi rst characteristic to be identifi ed as essential to the notion of  the fetish is that of  the fetish 
object’s irreducible materiality. The truth of  the fetish resides in its status as a material embodi-
ment; its truth is not that of  the idol, for the idol’s truth lies in its relation of  iconic resemblance to 
some immaterial model or entity. This was one basis of  the distinction between the feitiço and the
idolo in medieval Portuguese [Pietz 1985: 7].
In Christian literature, the worship of  man-made objects, along with idol worship, was 
not considered a true part of  religion. Fetishes were not considered to be possessed, however, 
as idols were, by an evil presence of, for example, Satan.
Pietz is interested in the idea that fetishes were regarded as simple objects, and suggested 
that the idea was derived from the interaction between different cultures in the circumstances 
of  trade. At an early stage, the concept of  fetishism already revealed an asymmetrical re-
lationship between the West and non-West (West Africa), or between Christian and non-
Christian. Fetishism was held to be a feature of  religions other than Christianity and to be 
present in the religious practices of  non-Christians, which were considered erroneous from 
the Christian perspective. When fetishes were discussed, they were a focus for criticizing the 
erroneous values of  people without a real, that is, Christian, God. Since no attempt was made 
to understand fetishes in context and because those who revered them were judged inferior, 
the stance was clearly discriminatory. By conceptualizing fetishes and fetishism, we are able, 
however, to question subject-object and self-other relationships. Furthermore, despite the 
lingering legacy of  Eurocentricity, it is important to differentiate fetishism from animism, 
manaism, shamanism, totemism, and various other concepts related to religious origins that 
gained currency after fetishism. Fetishism is not merely one among the many religious prac-
tices that were discovered in the non-Christian world. The word carried a value-judgement, 
and religious practices that involved fetishes were held to be based on erroneous perception.
The problem of  the nonuniversality and constructedness of  social value emerged in an intense 
6 Criticism of  Pietz’s Eurocentricism have been made by Graeber [2005]. See Pietz [1987] for details 
of  the relationship between idols and fetishes.
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form from the beginning of  the European voyages to black Africa. Thus, one of  the European 
voyagers to West Africa, the Venetian Alvise da Cadamosto, who sailed to Senegal under Portu-
guese charter in the late 1450’s, was moved to write of  the blacks of  Gambia, “Gold is much prized 
among them, in my opinion, more than by us, for they regard it as very precious; nevertheless they 
traded it cheaply, taking in exchange articles of  little value in our eyes...“[Pietz 1985: 9].
So, even though the idea of  fetishism was generated by Eurocentricism, it still carries 
a relativistic or constructivistic potential in that allows that the value of  objects differs be-
tween cultures. For the Portuguese merchants, men with sure faith in Christianity, who fi rst 
encountered fetishes, the practice of  designating value to what they considered worthless 
items was simply put down to to benightedness or ignorance. Once noticed, the power in-
vested in often innocuous objects, labelled now as fetishes, would later be found to be more 
universal than the fi rst observers could have imagined.7 This was brilliantly demonstrated by 
Marx’s characterization of  the fetishism of  commodities.
Exotic fetish objects became popular collector’s items in Holland when it overtook Portu-
gal and Spain as a maritime power. Eventually the term was incorporated into French. With 
the publication of  de Brosses’ Du Culte des dieux fetiches (1760), fetishism, defi ned as the 
religious practice of  worshipping fetishes, became an offi cial academic term.
For de Brosses, fetishism was the religious practice of  ascribing spiritual signifi cance to 
and worshipping things that were not of  the one true God. He went on to imply that it was 
an irrational practice befi tting African people, whom he believed, as a rational European, to 
be less highly evolved. It is noteworthy, however, that in de Brosses’ conception, plants and 
animals could also be fetishes. He also pointed out the existence of  fetishism in ancient Egypt 
[1988].
Fetishism was later used by Hegel and Comte in paradigms of  cultural evolution, and 
was proposed by Tyler and others as the origin of  religion.8 Used by Marx, Binet, and Freud, 
the word became generally familiar through its use in economics, psychology, and psychoa-
nalysis.
4. The denial of  non-existence
In The Fetishism of  Commodities and the Secret Thereof, the fourth section of  Chapter 
7 For example, Binet [1887] recognizes fetishism within Christianity.
8 Despite rising awareness of  the concept among the general public, the signifi cance of  fetishism 
in religious theology was lost by the mid-19th century. A fascinating discussion illustrating this 
point by Matsuzawa [2000] was brought to my attention by Jun’ichi Isomae of  the International 
Research Center for Japanese Studies.
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One, Commodities, in Das Kapital Vol. 1, Marx states the following:9
Whence, then, arises the enigmatical character of  the product of  labour, so soon as it assumes the 
form of  commodities? Clearly from this form itself. The equality of  all sorts of  human labour is 
expressed objectively by their products all being equally values; the measure of  the expenditure 
of  labour-power by the duration of  that expenditure, takes the form of  the quantity of  value of  
the products of  labour; and fi nally, the mutual relations of  the producers, within which the social 
character of  their labour affi rms itself, take the form of  a social relation between the products.
A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of  men’s 
labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of  that labour; because 
the relation of  the producers to the sum total of  their own labour is presented to them as a social 
relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of  their labour. This is the 
reason why the products of  labour become commodities, social things whose qualities are at the 
same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses. In the same way the light from an object 
is perceived by us not as the subjective excitation of  our optic nerve, but as the objective form of  
something outside the eye itself. But, in the act of  seeing, there is at all events an actual passage 
of  light from one thing to another, from the external object to the eye. There is a physical relation 
between physical things. But it is different with commodities. There, the existence of  the things 
qua commodities, and the value relation between the products of  labour which stamps them as 
commodities, have absolutely no connexion with their physical properties and with the material 
relations arising therefrom. There it is a defi nite social relation between men, that assumes, in their 
eyes, the fantastic form of  a relation between things. In order, therefore, to fi nd an analogy, we 
must have recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of  the religious world. In that world, productions 
of  the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life and entering into relation 
both with one another and the human race. So it is in the world of  commodities with the products 
of  men’s hands. This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself  to the products of  labour, so soon 
as they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of  
commodities [Marx 1965: 71–72].
The “products of  labour”, because they are created by human labour, if  they were ob-
jects of  human control, would be valued by the amount of  labour put into them. Once they 
are produced as commodities in a capitalist world, however, they “appear as independent 
beings endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one another and the human 
race”. Commodity fetishism is a manifestation of  the alienation of  the work of  the labourer 
9 See Guadiola-Riviera [2007] for Marx’s use of  fetishism in contexts other than commodity fetish-
ism, and to Ishizuka & Yasui [1998] for discussion concerning Marx’s commodity fetishism and his 
understanding of  de Brosses.
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in capitalist society, and it only comes into complete existence, “the ultimate of  materiality” 
[Yasui 1998: 155], with the development of  currency, especially in the form of  banknotes, 
which enables unit values to be given to each commodity.10
Marx’s discussion of  commodity fetishism encompassed commodities in general, but as 
observed by Benjamin [2002], commodities themselves are further “fetishized” as consumer 
society matures. In due course, commodities are propagated to feed consumer greed and a 
hunger for the status and potency that is conferred by products.11
While Marx applied de Brosses’ concept of  fetishism to capitalist society, Freud derived 
his concept from a slightly different background, as will be discussed later. One of  Freud’s 
early discussions of  fetishism is found in Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie. Published in 
1889, it draw on psychological research done by Binet and Krafft-Ebing. In this work, Freud 
introduces cases of  fetishism as “those in which the normal sexual object is replaced by 
another which bears some relation to it, but is entirely unsuited to serve the normal sexual 
aim”[1962: 19], and differentiates “normal” and “pathodological” fetishism. Normal fetish-
ism could, for example, be an exclusive sexual desire for people with a particular hair col-
our, or an interest in the underwear that belongs to an individual that one loves. This is 
merely a variation of  “normal love”, and does not preclude penetrative sexual intercourse. 
“Complete fetishism” denotes fetishism as a phenomenon likened to a pathological condition, 
where the object “becomes detached from a particular individual, and becomes the sole sexual 
object,”[Freud 1962: 20]. In contrast to fetishism as a part of  normal love, in pathodological 
fetishism, sexual congress is avoided.
Later, in 1927, Freud published Fetischismus (Fetishism) [Freud 1950] in which fetish-
ism was explained by relating it to a castration complex evoked by the sight of  maternal 
genitalia.
According to Freud, the absence of  the penis (phallus) may shock an infant boy when 
10 Yasui [1998: 155] explains money fetishism: “When banknotes were proposed as a representation 
of  currency as promissory notes, although valueless in and of  themselves, they were promised the 
power of  exchange proportionate to their convertibility with currency. Here we see the progress of  
materiality, where a simple piece of  paper, in other words, an object, becomes value itself, and con-
sequently possesses the power to control society. Fiat money, however, is the ultimate of  material-
ity in that a piece of  paper is guaranteed convertibility by the entire system, with no background 
proof  of  its value as embodiment of  labour, and dominates as a fetish. Fundamentally, the basis of  
value in both commodities and currency are in their embodiment of  labour. However, by replacing 
this relationship with one mediated through objects, objects are treated as if  they have inherent 
value, and people become caught in the activity trap of  aiming to accumulate wealth and money 
or having complete control over capital, thus furthering the fetishization of  commodities, money, 
and capital.” See also Godelier [1970].




he sees his mother’s genitalia. The boy may then “disavow” or deny (Verleugnung) this fact
(that his mother lacks a phallus). A substitute for the phallus does not, however, appear in 
the mother’s genitalia; detached from the genitalia, a representation of  the mother’s phallus 
arises elsewhere, as a fetish, for example, in specifi c body parts or articles of  clothing. In this 
way, the child overcomes his fear of  castration, because his mother now has a phallus. This 
fetish as a missing phallus is “a token of  triumph over the threat of  castration and a safe-
guard against it” [Freud 1950: 200]. The disavowal of  the absence of  a phallus, on one hand, 
creates an aversion towards female genitalia and, on the other, leads to a sexual desire for the 
fetish. According to Freud, this disavowal is not complete, and generally involves an internal 
and ambiguous confl ict between acceptance and denial.
As mentioned earlier, a fetish is a substitute for something else. In Freud’s account, this 
something is generalized as female genitalia, the female body, or the mother. Thinking again, 
however, we fi nd that Freud says that a substitute is found for something that did not exist 
in the fi rst place. The substitution is motivated by the absence of  a phallus.12 Traumatized 
after discovering that his mother does not have a phallus, the child subsequently disavows 
this fact. There is a denial that the mother was castrated and lacks a phallus, and through 
a psychological process in the child’s mind, he comes to a conviction that the mother must 
somewhere have a phallus. In this endowment, the fetish both acts as a substitute for some-
thing that does not exist, and simultaneously serves to conceal its absence. Furthermore, the 
fetish also serves to lament the missing object [Mulvey 1996: 5].
Freud’s account of  fetishism suggests that a fetish is not merely a misconception of  val-
ue nor a substitute for what is true or valued. Even so, in religious contexts, a piece of  wood 
has been held to be a fetish because it is ‘mistaken’ for a deity. And in economic analysis, 
commodities are considered fetishes because they are mistaken to have inherent value when, 
in fact, their true value is their embodied human labour. This idea of  misconception was es-
tablished before Freud’s analysis and the notion of  mistakenness remains in his account. For 
example, when a high-heeled shoe becomes a fetish, it takes the place of  the mother’s phal-
lus. But even before this, there is a more fundamental erroneous assumption that the mother 
should have a phallus.
Extending this analysis, we can wonder whether religious fetishes are created in de-
nial of  the fact that a deity or deities do not exist. This strand of  thought may help us go 
beyond the Orientalist account of  religious fetishism, where worshipping fetishes is associ-
ated with the ignorance of  people who have yet to receive the blessing of  the one true faith. 
This attitude both affi rms the superiority of  Western culture and makes a virtue of  mission-
12 For revisions of  the Freudian theory of  female fetishism, see Krips [1999: 8–9], which draws on 
theories by Lacan. For theories regarding fetishism among women, see Gamman & Makinen [1994: 
28–36] and Baudrillard [1981].
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ary zeal. The idea that fetishes might be born out of  denial of  a fact, that is the absence of  
god, would enable an analytical framework that could encompass phenomena ranging from 
tiny pieces of  wood worshipped by people in Africa to grand marble statues in the Vatican. 
To a disinterested observer, the absolute distinction between idol and fetish is of  interest only 
in terms of  what motivated the division, into fundamentally different classes, of  phenomena 
that are categorically similar.
Then, in economics, it is generally understood that commodities embody two types of  
value, use value and exchange value. If  we were to assume, however, just as with deities or 
the maternal phallus, that exchange value is initially non-existent, we might then consider 
whether making a fetish of  commodities is a way of  denying the original absence of  ex-
change value. This kind of  discussion of  commodities is even more fruitful when the idea of  
money is also worked into the argument.
The contention is that a fetish is not merely a phenomenon arising from a naïve misap-
prehension of  the facts. Rather it results from a two-fold displacement that endows a sub-
stitute object with some kind of  extra presence in the process of  denying a specifi c fact––in 
each instance an absence: the maternal phallus, deities, or exchange value. The substitute 
then becomes an object that has the power to enthral and, at the same time, distract attention 
from the original absence. In this way, fetishism involves two counterfactual acts: a denial of  
a disturbingly true state of  affairs, and the factitious endowment of  some other thing with a 
‘truth’ that was originally absent.13
In fetishism of  whatever kind, if  a fetish is regarded as a substitute for an absence, does 
it not follow that a fetish may be substituted for any absent phenomenon? Logically this 
may be true, but the creative energy required to conjure a fetish seems driven by non-trivial 
impulses. Fetishes seem to arise in special circumstances and, outside of  sexual fetishism, 
validity seems subject to the jury of  social opinion or convention. The objects of  substitution, 
however, can be more diverse. Anything can become an object of  religious worship, or a com-
modity, or an object of  sexual desire. In other words, rather than being a signifi é (something 
signifi ed), the fetish is a signifi cant fl ottant, a “fl oating signifi er.”
It should also be noted here that the logic of  fetish creation is by no means simple: the 
knowledge of  the fact (the mother does not have a phallus) and its disavowal (the mother 
actually has a phallus) is extremely ambivalent [Freud 1950]. Moreover, once a fetish is cre-
ated, it has an enduring presence in the minds of  those who respond to it. A sexual fet-
ish palpably stimulates, money is used every day for exchange, and people manifest ritual 
behaviour toward deities. When a critical observer denies these entities as phantasms pro-
13 Looking at the relationship of  the three types of  fetishism, some research [Krips 1999: 8–9] has 
been done in an attempt to relate sexual fetishism (private) to religious fetishism (public). Others 
have tried to come to a comprehensive understanding of  fetishism [Imamura 1992; Ellen 1988].
FETISHISM
141
duced by false consciousness, the denial threatens the basic tokens of  identity. This kind of  
truth undermines our lived experience of  the world. Devotion to the fetish seems to be a price 
we are willing to pay for relief  from the uneasiness of  absence.
In his 1919 work Das Unheimliche [The Uncanny], Freud states that the uncanny occurs
with the emergence of  something that should have remained repressed [Freud 1955: 240], and 
that “animism, magic and  sorcery, the omnipotence of  thoughts, man’s attitude to death, 
involuntary repetition, and the castration complex comprise practically all the factors which 
turn something frightening into something uncanny.” [Freud 1955: 242]. Freud’s extended 
discussion of  fetishism was not published until later, yet, it may be assumed that fetishes are 
also “uncanny” and trigger anxiety.14
5. Fetish networking
Any idea of  fetishism as a relationship between people, material objects, and the body 
is based on a twofold misconception––fi rst that something should be present when it is ab-
sent, and then that an arbitrary object can represent the presence with some special power. 
Moreover, it also assumes that a patently correct representation of  the true facts is possible. 
Needless to say, this kind of  assumption is exactly what underlies the modernist way of  
thinking discussed in the beginning of  this article.
Since the 18th century, seeking to reveal what is considered the true nature of  things, 
enlightened thought has paid great attention to criticising superstition and mindless custom. 
Such thought would have no problem debunking such a double misconception or denial. A 
venerated piece of  wood is not a god. Money is only a piece of  paper. The high-heeled shoe 
that arouses sexual interest is merely a shoe… Such assertions serve only to reinforce the 
worldview of  modernism. They provide no means of  creating new relationships by people 
with others, material objects, and nature.15 To go beyond this, we must accept that the idea of  
a completely objective investigator is a modernist myth.
As we grapple with understanding the motivation and mechanisms of  fetishism, es-
pecially if  we consider that it results from a two-fold misconception, we will be susceptible 
to our own brand of  false consciousness if  we assume our analysis is undertaken from a 
privileged position, or that we are ourselves immune from such misconceptions. The more 
we assert our objectivity, the greater the temptation to consider fetishists as deluded and, as 
such, inferior to our enlightened selves.
14 In Fetishism, Freud (1950: 201) uses the term “uncanny trauma”, which was brought to my atten-
tion by my colleague Kosuke Tsuiki.
15 The enlightened rationale typically develops towards unifi cation [Ellen 1988] and deconstruction 
(the argument that fetishism is meaningless [Pool 1990]), two seemingly opposite goals.
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Our earliest accounts of  religious fetishism, by Portuguese merchants who operated 
with commercial rationality within a larger Christian framework, saw fetishism as something 
done by African people, not by true believers. Compared with to procreative sexuality, sexual 
fetishism is apt to seem misguided or perverse. When commodity fetishism is considered, it is 
easy to regard as fetishists those unenlightened consumers who remain ignorant of  the true 
nature of  the capitalist economy. In each instance, the fetishist, in thrall to misconceptions, 
is cast as ‘the other’ in opposition to ‘the modernist self,’ who has some kind of  hotline to, or 
even ownership of, the truth: the fetishist is in error, an inferior ‘other’. Any new investiga-
tive project exploring fetishism must question both the one-way instrumental relationship of  
people with others, material objects, and nature, and the asymmetrical relationship between 
the self  and other (the inquiring self  and the fetishist) that is revealed by fetishism. For this 
to happen, it is necessary to begin the discussion from the viewpoint of  the fetishist, who has 
been regarded as inferior in the modernist outlook. As McCallum [1999: xvi] rightfully points 
out, rather than seeking to defi ne fetishism, it is more important to use fetishism as a way of  
thinking, as well as a way of  living.
The question then arises: How would fetishism dictate our way of  living? First of  all, we 
must realize and acknowledge that, much like the fetishists, we are also prone to misconcep-
tion. If  misapprehension is a distinguishing characteristic of  fetishism, we have to admit 
that we are prone to fetishistic acts of  creating concepts that distract attention away from 
absences. As Imamura [1992] claims, misconception is a universal mental mechanism. To go 
beyond the poor explanatory power of  the instrumental and symbolic outlooks, to develop 
a relationship of  interactive standing with others, objects, and nature, it is crucial that we 
properly respect misinterpretation, understanding the role it plays in creating interactive net-
works with others/objects/nature. After all, fetishes create intimate relationships and affect 
an individual’s desires, practices, health, and personal identity. Furthermore, as well as affect-
ing one’s personhood, a fetish can create an inseparable relationship with the body:
One way in which the medieval Portuguese feitiço was distinguished from idolo was that, whereas 
the idol was conceived as a freestanding statue, the fetish was typically some fabricated object 
worn about the body. Moreover, the idea of  the idol emphasized worship of  a false god or demonic 
spirit, whereas feitiços were practiced to achieve certain tangible effects (such as healing) upon or 
in service of  the user. The fourth theme found in the idea of  the fetish is, then, that of  the subjec-
tion of  the human body (as the material locus of  action and desire) to the infl uence of  certain 
signifi cant material objects that, although cut off  from the body, function as its controlling organs 
at certain moments [Pietz 1985: 10].
In other words, the body responds to the effects of  a fetish (e.g., an amulet). Here, I envi-
sion a fetish network in which the body and objects are connected in a mutually affecting 
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manner in relationships of  concordance. In this network, while rather closely controlling or 
governing their own bodies, surrounding objects, and other people, persons exert greater or 
lesser infl uence on the things that come to their attention. Meanwhile, they are also infl uenced 
by these things, and by other things that they may not be aware of. The link between the 
fetishist and the fetish is infl uenced by feelings of  power and pleasure as well as the desire 
for these things. The fetishist is simultaneously the subject and the object of  a desire and the 
solicitor of  desire. Desiring or wanting to keep company with the fetish, the fetishist wants 
what inheres in this object of  desire. We desire the fetish and we desire the fetish to desire us. 
Our lives are intertwined in a complex network of  desire that has fetishes as its core.
This network of  desire includes various types of  fetish, including one’s own body parts, 
that are objects of  desire. In our capability to misconceive and desire others to desire, we are 
all fetishists. This fact allows us to critically examine the modernist quest for truth even as 
we create a world that allows relationships of  concordance with objects, the body, others, 
and nature. For anthropology and sociology, concepts of  fetishism, a new model of  agents 
(as fetishists) may open an additional dimension and thus enable a better understanding of  
the nature of  the networks involving fetishes (which is not limited to people). Although this 
network conception is not completely immune to the criticisms of  anthropocentrism, because 
it can accommodate ambivalent emotions in the relationship between people and things, it 
may be robust enough to resolve some issues. The ambivalent emotions aroused by fetishes 
cannot be reduced to an “affordance” theory.
McCallum [1999], another thinker dissatisfi ed with prevailing dualistic paradigms of  
thought, suggested that Freud’s theory of  fetishism is not based on rigid ideas of  gender 
and sexuality. In fact, Freud’s account insinuates the vulnerability of  such ideas. She goes on 
to argue that fetishism is a way of  life that ensures the possibility of  a more liberal identity 
formation and greater diversity of  interpretation. For example, to deny that the mother’s 
absence of  a phallus while simultaneously acknowledging its absence by creating a fetish is 
effectively an acknowledgment of  gender and sexual differences. McCallum claims that the 
confl ict involved in the denial of  the truth leads to creativity. Furthermore, she speculates 
that sexual fetishists realize that they are incomplete, and that friendship based on care arises 
from this realization.
While I am still unwilling to uncritically advocate fetishism,16 I do fi nd McCallum’s idea 
that fetishism is meaningful both for analysis—to better understand the world—and also as 
a way to better live is certainly worth thinking about.




Fetishism is a diffi cult issue. The original notion arose in the context of  the encounter 
with “the other”, unenlightened by the grace of  god and so inferior. As such, it is a concept 
that may be used to open up modernist discourses that are ultimately based on enlightened 
rationality. Practically, in religious studies, theology, anthropology, material culture studies, 
and other academic fi elds that are susceptible to enlightened rationality, any fetishism re-
search naturally requires criticism. Meanwhile, we live in a world surrounded by eroticized 
commodities [Benjamin 2002]: inevitably, we become fetishists whether we choose to or not. 
This world, however, should not be justifi ed by our proposal of  “fetishist thinking” as op-
posed to modernist thinking. Rather, as analysts seeking knowledge that helps us and oth-
ers to better locate ourselves in the world and lead better lives, we need to sustain a critical 
attitude that helps us seek to discover what is and compare it to an idea of  what could be. 
Fetishism implies a way of  life, and comes with a set of  concepts that enable fresh interpreta-
tions of  people and their relationships with others, objects, and nature. At the same time, as 
a phenomenon, it seems to be an obstruction, a thing to be criticized.
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